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Abstract  
The presence of women in parliaments (and factors influencing this) have been high on the research agenda for several 
decades. In this paper, we focus on the gendered effects of one specific institutional factor: the provision of compulsory 
voting. While it could be argued that compulsory voting is beneficial for the formal representation of women, its effect on 
their descriptive representation remained largely underexposed. Studlar and McAllister (2002) found a negative effect from 
compulsory voting on women’s descriptive representation, but no theoretical explanations were given. We develop two 
possible explanations here: potential non‐voters vote less sophisticated and they have different attitudes about the role of 
women in political life.  
In our Belgian case study, we found that the only significant differences between voters and potential non‐voters are 
related to the level of sophistication of the vote. Non‐voters vote significantly more for top candidates (mostly men) and 
give significantly less preference votes for candidates lower down the list. Differences in gender role attitudes do not 
provide an explanation.  
We conclude that the descriptive representation of female politicians would increase by abolishing compulsory voting. But 
since women are more likely to abstain if voting was no longer compulsory, their formal representation would be worse off. 
As both forms of representation leads to substantive representative representation, the maintenance of compulsory voting 
constitutes a dilemma for women activists.  
 
Introduction 
Political representation is a widely used concept. The contemporary popularity of the concept 
depends much upon the fact that it is linked with the idea of democracy, as well as with ideas of 
liberty and justice (Pitkin, 1967). The concept of representation, as developed in Pitkin’s (1967) work, 
is complex, however. She identifies four distinct, but interconnected dimensions of representation. 
Formal representation focuses on the rules and procedures through which representatives are 
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chosen. Descriptive representation, or representativeness, refers to the extent to which 
representatives stand for the represented. Substantive representation, or responsiveness, is defined 
as acting in the interests of the represented in a manner responsive to them. Finally, symbolic 
representation refers to the feelings of the represented of being fairly and effectively represented.  
In this paper, the effect of compulsory voting on women’s representation will be considered for the 
formal and descriptive dimension.  
In order to be formally representative, political representation must arise and be maintained through 
a set of procedural standards of authorization and accountability, usually by way of free and fair 
elections. The audience selects a representative, constrained by a set of rules in which a selection 
agent and a decision rule is specified. In most democratic systems, the selection agent is constituted 
by voters, men and women, within an electoral district (Rehfeld, 2006: 3‐5). Since women are 
entitled to vote in western democracies, they can be considered as formally represented. The extent 
to which voters make effectively use of the possibility to cast a vote could, however, also be 
considered as a part of formal representation. Turnout might differ between groups of citizens, and 
constitutes as such biases in formal representation. 
In terms of descriptive representation, a legislative assembly is said to be representative if its make‐
up constitutes a miniaturized model of society (Tremblay, 2007: 7). Although women form more than 
half the population, they constitute only a small minority of all members of parliament worldwide, 
just over 21 per cent (Inter‐Parliamentary Union, 2014). To explain this underrepresentation, scholars 
refer to the supply and demand model of candidate selection (Randall, 1982). This can be understood 
as a sequential model of political recruitment progressing from those who are eligible to run to those 
who aspire to run, those who are nominated and those who are eventually elected (Krook & 
Schwindt‐Bayer, 2013: 556). The question of voter response to women candidates has been an issue 
that has attracted considerable scholarly attention. Overall, the findings indicate that women are not 
disadvantaged by voters: they not only vote for male and female candidates at equal rates (Norris et 
al., 1992), but may even sometimes express a preference for women over men, controlling for other 
influences (Black & Erickson, 2003; Murray, 2008; Brians, 2005). The underrepresentation of women 
appears to be largely due to the fact that women are not equally supported by the media, by their 
party and by society in general to pursue votes, which is called a ‘systemic bias’ (Wauters et al, 2010 ; 
Verge & Troupel, 2011).  
A growing literature (Krook & Schwindt‐Bayer, 2013; Rule, 1994; Studlar & McAllister, 2002; 
Duverger, 1955; Caul, 1999) has emphasized the importance of institutional factors as an intervening 
variable for explaining the (descriptive) representation of women. In this paper, we will focus on one 
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specific institutional variable that is part of the electoral system: the provision of compulsory voting. 
While it could be argued that this provision is beneficial for the formal representation of socially 
disadvantaged groups (including women), its effect on the descriptive representation of women 
remains underexposed. In a cross‐country analysis on the macro level, Studlar & McAllister (2002) 
found a negative effect from compulsory voting on women’s descriptive representation, but no 
theoretical explanations for this finding were given. We will here conduct an in‐depth analysis on 
Belgium, one of the about 30 countries using compulsory voting. By conducting a study at the 
individual level, we hope to gain more insight in the underlying mechanisms of the gender effects of 
compulsory voting. More in particular, we will investigate whether voters who no longer would vote 
when compulsory voting is lifted, are more or less likely to vote for women. In doing so, we hope to 
make a significant contribution to the existing literature on electoral systems and the factors that 
shape women’s representation.  
This paper is structured as follows: first, we situate the gender‐related effects of electoral 
institutions. Then, we introduce compulsory voting as part of the electoral system and indicate how it 
could impact on the descriptive representation of women. Next, we describe the methodology and 
the results of the empirical analysis. We end with conclusions. 
Electoral institutions 
According to Krook and Schwindt‐Bayer, electoral institutions are “the formal and informal rules 
governing the electoral process” (2013: 554). Electoral institutions are critical for determining 
election outcomes and are an important variable affecting why women are underrepresented in 
legislatures. These electoral arrangements are not neutral: they are means to exclude or include 
groups (Rule, 1994). The electoral system has been identified as one of the most important factors 
explaining cross‐national variations in women’s representation (Studlar & McAllister, 2002). 
We will now first discuss the gender effects of the electoral formula (which is a crucial part of the 
electoral system) and then devote attention to other aspects of the electoral system, including 
district magnitude and ballot structure. 
There is a broad consensus in the literature (Duverger, 1955; Caul, 1999; Studlar & McAllister, 2002; 
Rule, 1987) that the list variant of proportional representation (PR), in which seats are allocated 
among lists in accordance with their respective share of the vote, is more propitious for the 
nomination and election of women than the plurality/majority rule, in which the largest party obtains 
the seat in single‐member districts.  
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Scholars have offered a number of reasons to explain why PR systems produce more women in office 
than majoritarian systems. The most popular explanation focuses on differences in district 
magnitude, i.e. the number of seats elected in a district. PR systems have, by definition, consistently 
higher district magnitudes (Duverger, 1955; Rule, 1987; Matland, 2005). It is thought that as district 
magnitude increases, election strategies change. Since contests in single‐member districts are zero‐
sum games, the party can nominate one person per district and has no chance to balance its ticket. 
Female candidates have to compete directly against all men, who often represent powerful 
intraparty constituencies and have more political experience. When district magnitude increases, the 
chance that a party will win several seats in the district increases, which gives more leeway to 
balance their tickets (Matland, 2005). This makes it easier for party officials to slate women 
candidates: the party may see this as essential to its appeal to (a part of ) the voters, and men do not 
need to be deposed for a woman to receive a spot on the party’s list (Matland, 1993: 738).  
Darcy, Welch and Clark (1987) point to the fact that greater district magnitude will not automatically 
lead to an increase in female representation. There is an interaction between district magnitude and 
number of parties: in systems with a large district magnitude and many parties, winning 
representation is just as difficult as in electoral systems with smaller magnitudes and fewer parties. If 
each party only expects to win one or two seats, competition for slots at the top of the party list 
become zero‐sum games similar to those fought in single‐member districts. According to Matland 
(1993), a party will satisfy the more powerful interest first and move on to weaker interests only 
afterwards. If the party has several seats at its disposal, legitimate, but weaker, interests have a 
higher chance to be represented. If the party has few seats, those weaker interests will not make it 
to parliament. 
In general, we can conclude that PR systems, which have greater district and party magnitudes, are 
more beneficial for women’s representation than majoritarian systems. There are yet other 
differences within PR systems. Some characteristics of PR systems stimulate women’s representation 
more than others.  
Ballot structure is one of them (Krook & Schwindt‐Bayer, 2013). Systems of list PR have rules that 
determine which candidates fill the seats won by a list. In closed formats, voters choose only among 
lists, not among individual candidates. The party determines the rank‐ordering of candidates, and the 
seats obtained by a party are allocated to the candidates according to their order on the lists. In 
contrast, in open formats, voters are able to influence which of the party’s candidates are elected by 
means of personal voting, since seats are allocated to the candidates according to the number of 
preferential votes obtained. Finally, flexible formats give both party leaders and voters some say in 
5 | P a g e  
 
the allocation of a list’s seats : voters may cast ballots for certain candidates, but these preferences 
do not exclusively determine who fills the seats won by a list (Schmidt, 2008: 191). 
The crucial question is whether it is easier to convince voters to actively vote for women candidates, 
or to convince party leaders to give women a prominent and safe position on the list (Matland, 2005; 
Wauters et al, 2010). Duverger (1955) already suggested that female candidates may be more 
successful under electoral rules that give voters less choice. Since the mid‐1990s, the view that 
closed lists are more advantageous for the election of women has definitely become the most 
common perspective (Schmidt, 2008; Castles, 1981; Rule, 1987; Caul, 1999). This has coincided with 
the increasing use of gender quotas and placement mandates, i.e. requirements that female 
candidates be distributed in electable positions, rather than clustered at the bottom of the list 
(Schmidt, 2008: 193). Whereas quotas can be adopted regardless of ballot structure, placement 
mandates make little sense in open list or in flexible formats in which seats are primarily allocated by 
preferential votes. 
In sum, research on the effects of electoral rules has focused on broad distinctions between PR and 
majoritarian systems, and has examined nuances in district magnitude and ballot structure. But it has  
overlooked other important parts of electoral systems that could also have gendered effects (Krook 
& Schwindt‐Bayer, 2013: 569). Compulsory voting is such as an aspect, which will be tackled in the 
next section.  
Compulsory voting 
In this paper, we want to dig deeper into the relationship between compulsory voting and women’s 
representation. Therefore, we will first conceptualize and situate compulsory voting. Next, we will 
give an overview of the pros and contras of compulsory voting and third, we will develop theoretical 
arguments about the possible effects of compulsory voting on gender and women’s representation.  
Conceptualization 
Most democratic governments consider participating in national elections a right of citizenship. In 
some countries, this is considered a citizen’s civic responsibility, or even a duty. In these countries, 
voting at elections has been made compulsory, which has been regulated in national constitutions 
and electoral laws. Liechtenstein (1862), Belgium (1893), Argentina (1914), Luxembourg (1919) and 
Australia (1924) were among the first countries in the world to introduce compulsory voting laws. 
Nowadays, approximately 30 countries in the world have regulations that make voting compulsory 
(Gratschew, 2004). Most of them are in Latin America or Western Europe, but there are also a few 
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cases in Asia. Examples are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Congo, Egypt, Greece, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, Thailand and Turkey (IDEA, 2015).  
Pros and contras 
Advocates of compulsory voting argue that decisions made by democratically elected governments 
are more legitimate when higher proportions of the population participate. This argument is often 
posited in societies where compulsory voting is particularly effective in making traditionally 
marginalized groups participate, which thus boosts their formal representation. Voting, voluntarily or 
otherwise, also has an educational effect upon the citizens. Moreover, democracy is often 
considered as government by the people. Presumably this includes all people, which reinforces the 
idea that it is every citizen’s responsibility to elect their representatives (Gratschew, 2004).  
The leading argument against compulsory voting is that it is not consistent with the freedom 
associated with democracy. The enforcement of the law can be seen as an infringement of the 
citizens’ freedom associated with democratic elections. It may discourage the political education of 
the electorate because people forced to participate will react against the perceived source of 
oppression. It has also been proved that forcing the population to vote results in an increased 
number of invalid and blank votes compared to countries that have no compulsory voting laws 
(Puplick & McGuiness, 1998). Another consequence of mandatory voting is the possible high number 
of random votes: voters who are voting against their free will, may check off a party or a candidate at 
random. These voters do not care for whom they vote as long as the government is satisfied that 
they have fulfilled their duty (IDEA, 2015).  
Effects on gender 
Compulsory voting systems do not seem to affect the results of the various parties competing in an 
election. In a simulation for Belgian elections, Hooghe and Pelleriaux (1998) found that no party 
would lose more than 1.5 per cent of the vote by abolishing compulsory voting (see also: Hooghe, 
Quintelier & Marien, 2011; Reuchamps et al, 2015).It remains unclear, however, which gender 
effects can be linked with the provision of compulsory voting and turnout. As mentioned before, it is 
our aim to consider the effects of compulsory voting on women’s representation for the formal and 
descriptive dimension.  
As for the formal dimension, there is a general trend towards lower turnout figures in Western 
Europe, even despite provisions for compulsory voting. One of the problematic effects of this trend is 
that low voter turnout is usually associated with strong and persistent patterns of inequality (Verba, 
Schlozman & Brady, 1995). According to Lijphart (1997), in countries without compulsory voting, 
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more privileged citizens (those with higher incomes, greater wealth and better education) exercise 
their right to vote more often than less privileged citizens. Lower turnout rates are therefore 
expected to strengthen the social stratification of the electoral process (Kittelson, 2005), which is 
detrimental to the formal representation of several groups in the population. They do not have the 
chance (or at least a lower chance) to give a mandate to the representatives they prefer. Low turnout 
rates also lead to a distortion of the ideological and political preferences of the enfranchised 
population at large, endangering their substantive representation. As a result, some segments of the 
electorate become more influential in the decision‐making process, which runs counter to the 
democratic principle of equal consideration of all interests (Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995 ; Martin, 
2003). 
When it comes to gender, which has already been extensively studied in relation to formal 
representation, results are mixed in terms of differences in turnout. Kittelson (2005) argues that men 
are more likely to participate in elections than women. Hooghe and Pelleriaux (1998) also conclude 
that abolishing compulsory voting would introduce considerable bias in the composition of the 
electorate. The willingness of women to vote is lower than that of men. According to Hooghe, 
Quintelier and Marien (2011) in their cross‐country analysis, differences between women and men 
remain rather small. De Winter and Ackaert (1998) indicate, however, that women do not show up 
less because of their gender, but due to lower educational and professional status. According to 
them, if we control for other variables (like educational level and professional status), there is no 
longer a gender effect. Also Campbell (2006) could not find gender differences in voter turnout 
patterns in her analysis on the UK. In a chapter on the recent Belgian election study, Reuchamps et al 
(2015) offer an analysis of the individual characteristics of potential non‐voters. They found that 
women are more likely to abstain if voting was no longer compulsory, but that this effect disappears 
when other variables (such as political interest and income) are added to the explanatory model. 
When it comes to the descriptive dimension, the number of studies has been far more limited. In 
their comparative analysis of women’s legislative representation since 1950, Studlar & McAllister 
(2002) point to the fact that there are two important factors in influencing the proportion of female 
elected representatives: the electoral system and the level of turnout. They analyze female 
representation for 20 industrialized democracies over a period of half a century (from 1950 to 2000). 
They contend that turnout and voter registration are differentially located among social groups, as a 
consequence of differences in political interest and political involvement. According to them, this 
could have an influence on women’s representation. Their reasoning is that the higher the turnout 
(either stimulated by compulsory voting or not), the more diverse the voters, and the higher the 
share of elected women. Contrary to their expectations, Studlar and McAllister (2002) found that 
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compulsory voting had a negative effect on women’s representation, with each percentage increase 
in turnout reducing women’s representation by 0.14 per cent. Compulsory voting systems reduced 
women’s representation even by about 3.5 per cent. The authors did not provide any explanation for 
this unexpected outcome, however. It is our aim to search for these explanations and to consider 
their actual role in influencing women’s descriptive representation. To that end, we develop two 
theoretical explanations in the next section.  
Explaining the effects of compulsory voting on descriptive representation 
The fact that compulsory voting systems are linked with lower levels of women’s descriptive 
representation can be due to different effects. Since no explanations have been provided by other 
scholars so far, it is our intention to broaden this understanding. The explanations for why potential 
non‐voters would vote significantly less for women can be divided into two broad categories. First, 
potential non‐voters are thought to vote in a less sophisticated manner and, second, they are 
considered as being less convinced of the importance of political participation by women.  
 
First, Reuchamps et al (2015) found a strong link between potential absenteeism and political 
interest. Those who are not interested in politics, will not participate in elections. The provision of 
compulsory voting forces also voters with low interest in politics to vote. This has several 
consequences on voting behavior.  
The most extreme consequence is, what Reuchamps et al (2015) and IDEA (2015) suggest: 
compulsory voting leads to arbitrary votes, as it forces electors who would otherwise abstain to cast 
any vote. Potential non‐voters check off a candidate at random.  
But consequences could also be more subtle, in the sense that voters with low levels of political 
interest will make fewer use of preferential voting, when forced to vote. According to the resource 
model (Marsh, 1985), casting a preference vote is more demanding on the part of voters, since this 
requires to learn about candidates and compare them (Shugart et al 2005). Since potential non‐
voters are less politically interested, they are less likely to make the effort to cast a preference vote. 
André et al (2012), using data from the Belgian 2009 regional elections, indeed come to the 
conclusion that a higher degree of political interest and resources is more likely to be translated into 
candidate‐based voting. Preferential voting in general, and specifically for women (who often take 
positions lower down the list), can thus be considered as sophisticated electoral behavior that 
requires skills and attitudes (Mariën et al, forthcoming).  
Another effect is that potential non‐voters vote more for incumbents, i.e. existing holders of a 
political office. Incumbents have structural advantages over non‐incumbents during elections: they 
often have more name recognition because of their previous work in the office and they have easier 
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access to campaign finance (Boundless, 2015). Related is the advantage enjoyed by the head of list. 
Maddens et al (2006) indicate that candidates in prominent positions on the ballot form draw 
automatically more votes, even when other factors are controlled for. This effect can be labelled 
Ballot Position Effect (Maddens et al, 2006; Geys and Heyndels, 2003; Lutz, 2010). In Belgian 
elections, the most favorable positions are those at the top and the bottom of the list of main 
candidates. Female candidates used to be underrepresented at the top of the list. For that reason, 
the revised quota law required that in 2003 elections at least one of the three top places on the list 
should be reserved for a woman. Parties initially complied in a minimalistic way with the quota 
regulations concerning the top positions, but recently progress has been made (Wauters et al, 2014). 
At the most recent elections of 2014, about 29 per cent of all heads of lists were women (Smulders et 
al, 2014). This means that most women continue to occupy less attractive places on the list. Male 
party elites are often reluctant to lose their power position and while they agree to introduce quota 
regulations, they are often mitigating these regulations in practice (Dahlerup, 2007).  
 
The ranking of candidates on the list is determined by the party. Women still face a major barrier in 
the attitudes of selectors and do not make it to the top of the ballot. Rasmussen (1983) points to the 
fact that party selectors and other supporters hold sex role stereotypes which reinforce images of 
women in traditional roles, and thereby undermine the qualities and experience which women bring 
to public life. These attitudes may be particularly influential in preventing women from being 
selected to fight contests at the top. The crucial point is thus that political parties have the power to 
compensate for the skewed nature of their pool of aspirants through the use of party rules, but that 
they are often reluctant to do this.  
In sum, one major explanation is that potential non‐voters do not seem to deliberately vote less for 
women, but vote less sophisticated (more list, head of list and incumbency voting), which is a 
disadvantage for women, because often they are not on top of the ballot and have less political 
experience. 
 
Secondly, we can point to differences in voter attitudes about the role of women in political life 
(Jennings, 2006 ; Bittner et al., 2010), which is also sometimes called ‘gender ideology’ (Shvedova, 
2005; Erzeel & Caluwaerts, 2015) or ‘gender role attitudes’ (Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004). This concept 
refers to opinions of individual voters about the role of men and women in society. This role could 
encompass several spheres, including family life, the workplace and the political sphere (Brooks & 
Bolzendahl, 2004 ; Bittner et al, 2010). We focus here on attitudes about the role of women in 
politics. These have to be discerned from gender consciousness, which refers to self‐identification, 
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and from feminist attitudes, which refer to very specific attitudes mostly also including actions to 
overcome negative situations (Erzeel & Caluwaerts, 2015). Although over time clear progress has 
been made, not all voters are equally convinced about the extent that women should play a 
prominent role in politics (Jennings, 2006).  
The limited number of studies that have focused on the link between ‘political gender ideology’ and 
voting behavior come to the conclusion that there is a significant effect from the former on the latter 
(Goodyear‐Grant & Croskill, 2011 ; Erzeel & Caluwaerts, 2015). Voters more open to women taking 
up a prominent political role, are more likely to vote for women. This finding points us to the 
importance of considering gender role attitudes in explaining voting behavior for women. 
As indicated above, not all individuals hold the same gender role attitudes. Several factors could be 
held accountable for differences in these role attitudes, both over time and between individuals at 
one particular moment (Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004 ; Jennings, 2006). For our comparison between 
voters and non‐voters at the present time, the exposure hypothesis put forward by Jennings (2006) is 
especially relevant. This hypothesis posits that differences in the role conceptions about women in 
politics could be explained by differences in exposure to practices of gender equality and to 
discussions about political underrepresentation of women. Exposure is, as Jennings notes, driven by 
media content, social movements and interpersonal relations. This is especially relevant for women 
politicians, who in general receive less media attention than their male counterparts (Kahn, 1994 ; 
Wauters et al, 2010). In sum, knowledgeable voters, who have been intensively exposed to 
prominent female politicians and to discussions about women’s political underrepresentation, are 
more likely to be receptive to gender equality in the political sphere.  
This line of reasoning corresponds with the approach of Bittner et al (2010), who include a related 
variable, i.e. political sophistication, as explanatory variable in their analysis of gender role attitudes. 
Political sophistication is linked to other concepts, such as political knowledge (used by Bitter et al 
(2010) to operationalize political sophistication) and political interest. At the same time, these 
concepts traditionally have a large impact on the decision whether or not to cast a vote (e.g. 
Reuchamps et al, 2015). 
Taken together, voters who are less politically interested, have a higher chance to stay at home when 
compulsory voting is lifted, and as they tend to be less open to women in politics, they are less likely 
to vote for women. Therefore, when these low interested voters are forced to vote by the provision 
of compulsory voting, women candidates will be worse off, we hypothesize. 
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Research design & method 
In this section, we first give some background information about the Belgian case, and then describe 
the survey data we use and the variables that will play a center role in the empirical analysis. 
We start by discussing compulsory voting, the electoral system and the quota regulation in Belgium. 
Belgium is one of the few countries in the world in which a generalized system of mandatory voting 
still exists. The current Belgian system of compulsory voting leads to a turnout of about 89 per cent 
which is far above average turnouts in other countries. Despite the fact that voting is compulsory in 
Belgium, the number of people that do not vote is rising, but only very slowly. It becomes 
increasingly unfeasible to enforce the legal obligation to vote. The judicial system is already 
overburdened, and it gives little priority to the prosecution of non‐voters (Hooghe & Pelleriaux, 1998: 
420).  
Belgium has a PR electoral system with flexible lists: a Belgian voter has the choice between casting a 
preferential vote for one or more candidates (on a single party list) and casting a list vote. Candidates 
receiving sufficient preferential votes to pass the election threshold are automatically elected. The 
other candidates can reach the threshold by making use of the list votes. These list votes are 
distributed to candidates according to their order on the list, offering a substantial advantage to 
candidates at the top of the list. Seats are thus mainly awarded to candidates in the order in which 
they appear on the list.  
Legislation concerning the presence of women on candidate lists has been introduced in Belgium for 
several years. In 1994 a first quota law, which stated that maximum two thirds of the candidates of a 
list could be of the same sex, was introduced. In 2002, this was changed into the requirement of an 
equal number of men and women (with a maximum difference of one in case of an odd number of 
candidates) on the list. In addition, one of the two highest positions on the list is reserved for a 
women candidate. This quota legislation has led to substantial increase of women MPs (Wauters et 
al, 2014).  
For our empirical analysis, we make use of data of the PartiRep Election Study, which is an electoral 
panel survey held before (pre‐electoral wave) and after (post‐electoral wave) the European, federal 
and regional elections of 2014 in Belgium (see: www.partirep.eu). We focus in this paper on the 
federal (or national) elections, which are generally perceived as the most important ones (Dandoy et 
al, 2015). In the pre‐electoral wave, based on a stratified sample of eligible voters in two main 
Belgian regions (Flanders and Wallonia), face‐to‐face CAPI interviews were conducted among 2,019 
respondents (response rate of 45 per cent). The same respondents were contacted again for the 
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post‐electoral wave shortly after Election Day in which telephone CATI interviews were used. This 
yielded 1,532 respondents (response rate of 76 per cent). Respondents were also asked to return a 
self‐administered mock‐ballot on which they had to cast exactly the same (preference) votes as on 
their real voting ballot. This innovative method was previously used in the Irish National Election 
Studies (McElroy and Marsh 2010) and in a study on Belgian local elections (Pilet et al, 2013). This 
methodology is particularly useful in an open list system with a high number of preference votes, as 
it allows to obtain detailed information on the kind of preferential votes.  
As for the variable about compulsory voting, respondents were asked “If voting was not compulsory 
in Belgium, would you always; often; sometimes or never vote for the Belgian federal elections?”. 
These four different categories were recoded into 2 categories: always (1), and often, sometimes or 
never (2). We follow here the same categorization as Reuchamps et al (2015).  
 
Table 1. Answers on the question whether respondent would still vote when compulsory voting 
would be abolished (N = 1628) 
 
Type Answer N % 
Voter Always 796 48,9 
Non‐voter 
Often 224 13,8 
Sometimes 182 11,2 
Never 425 26,1 
 
Results indicate that a small majority, 51 per cent, say that they would no longer vote. In comparison 
with a previous Belgian election study (1991), we notice a rise in the proportion of people that would 
no longer vote (Hooghe & Pelleriaux, 1998). For sake of clarity, we will call those who will always vote 
‘voters’, while the others will be labelled as ‘non‐voters’. 
 
Belgium has a flexible list PR‐system, which means that voters can use their preference votes in 
various ways. They can choose to cast none, one or multiple preference votes on candidates of one 
or both sex(es) within one party list (see also Mariën et al, forthcoming). Given that the first position 
on the list is a highly visible position, it is interesting to distinguish between casting one preference 
vote on the first candidate of the list and casting a preference vote for another candidate lower 
down the list. These options result in a variable with seven categories: voting for only women 
including the options: (1) casting one preference vote on the first candidate on the list (2) voting for 
one woman ‐ not the first candidate on the list, (3) voting for multiple women; and voting for only 
men including the options: (4) casting one preference vote on the first candidate on the list, (5) 
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voting for one man, not the first candidate on the list, (6) voting for multiple men; and finally (7) 
voting on both men and women. This will allow us to sketch a rich and multi‐faceted picture of voting 
for women in Belgium, taking into account the complexity of this voting behavior.  
 
The attitude about women’s role in political life was measured by two items in the questionnaire on 
which respondents could strongly agree, agree, agree nor disagree, disagree or strongly disagree. The 
first item was about an equal division of political responsibilities between men and women, the 
second one was about the need to have an equal number of men and women represented in 
parliament.1 
 
Results 
This section is divided into two parts: in the first part, we describe differences in voting for women 
between voters and non‐voters. In the second part, we will test the two theoretical explanations by 
looking at the complexity of voting behavior and support for a political role for women.  
Descriptive part 
We start with the descriptive analysis. Two findings immediately strike the eye when looking at 
differences in the kind of vote between voters and non‐voters (i.e. voters who would no longer vote 
if compulsory voting would be lifted) (see Table 2).  
First, the percentage of list voters is significantly higher among non‐voters compared to voters: 57 
per cent versus 47 per cent. As list votes are transferred according to the list order and women only 
take 29 per cent of top positions on the list (Smulders et al, 2014), a high share of list votes is 
detrimental for women candidates. 
Table 2: Kind of vote for voters and non‐voters (list vote versus preference vote) 
Answer Voter (N=613) Non-voter (N = 531) Significance 
% % 
List vote 47,6 57,3 0,001 
Preference vote 52,4 42,8 
     For at least one woman 25,9 16,4 
0,019 
     For no woman     23,3 22,6 
     Unknown 3,1 3,8  
                                                          
1 Other gender‐related items were included in the questionnaire, but as they were mainly about the 
appropriateness of the use of instruments to overcome underrepresentation (such as quota, penalties for 
parties or companies, and gender neutral education), they are not used in this analysis. 
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Secondly, the percentage of voters casting at least one vote for a woman candidate is with almost 26 
per cent among voters significantly higher than among non‐voters where only 16 per cent of them 
voted for at least one woman. This means that female politicians would have a greater voter share 
when the votes of non‐voters would not be taken into account. 
Taken together, non‐voters do not only cast fewer preference votes, they do also vote less often for 
women candidates when casting a preference vote. These two findings indicate that female 
politicians would gain by abolishing compulsory voting. Or, in other words, compulsory voting has a 
negative effect on the descriptive representation of women. This finding is in line with results of 
Studlar and McAllister (2002). 
Explanatory part 
We divided the explanations for why non‐voters vote significantly less for women into two broad 
categories. It could be that they do not vote for women because their votes are less ‘sophisticated’ 
(by following the closed lists presented by party elites). Another possible explanation is that non‐
voters are less convinced of the quality of women in politics and that they hold sex role stereotypes 
which reinforce images of women in traditional roles, thereby undermining the qualities and 
experience which women bring to public life. 
For the first explanation, we already demonstrated in Table 2 that non‐voters prefer list voting over 
preference voting. But we will dig deeper and investigate the kind of preference vote more into 
detail. We looked more in particular at whether a vote was casted for the candidate at the top of the 
ballot, a vote for another candidate on the list, a vote for more than one candidate on the list, and 
whether a candidate’s gender makes a difference in these kind of votes.  
Table 3: Kind of vote for voters and non‐voters (kind of preference vote) 
Voted for… Voter (N = 321) Non-voter (N = 227) Significance 
% % 
1 woman as head of list 6,0 9,7 (ns) 
1 man as head of list 26,5 37,9 0,007 
1 woman lower on list 13,6 9,7 (ns) 
1 man lower on list 11,4 14,1 (ns) 
several women 5,3 2,9 (ns) 
several men 9,9 5,3 0,060 
several men and women 27,8 20,3 0,053 
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Results in Table 3 indicate that the only significant differences between voters and non‐voters lie in 
the following three types of voting behavior: non‐voters vote significantly more for male top 
candidates and give significantly less preference votes for several men, and for several men and 
women together. This is a clear confirmation of the ‘less sophisticated vote’ thesis. Non‐voters have 
a clear preference for votes that do not require much effort and knowledge. We already saw in Table 
2 that they prefer list votes. When casting a preference vote, it becomes apparent from Table 3 that 
they often only vote for the head of list: 37 per cent of the non‐voters do so when a man ‘pulls’ the 
list and 9 per cent when a woman is head of list.  
Votes that suppose more in‐depth knowledge about candidates, such as voting for several 
candidates, are only seldom casted by non‐voters: almost 3 per cent votes for several women, 5 per 
cent votes for several men and 20 per cent votes for several men and women. Together less than 30 
per cent of the non‐voters who cast a preference vote, indicates a preference for more than one 
candidate. To compare: for voters, the same percentage is above 40 per cent.  
It is furthermore very noticeable that there are no significant differences on whether or not to vote 
for female heads of lists, whether or not to vote for one woman and whether or not to vote for more 
than one woman. This points us to the fact that non‐voters do not appear to have a negative bias 
towards women candidates, but that their less frequent vote for women is caused by the fact that 
this kind of voters does not really ‘choose’ candidates, but follows the figure heads (mostly men) put 
forward by the party. 
 
Now, we move towards the second explanation, i.e. non‐voters are less supportive towards a 
political role for women. We analyze whether there are differences in opinion between voters and 
non‐voters concerning two statements.  
Table 4: Support for a political role for women (row percentages) 
 Women and men should be given equal responsibilities in politics (N = 1621) 
 (Strongly) agree Agree nor disagree Strongly (disagree) 
Voter 89,4 7,6 3,0 
Non‐voter 88,3 7,7 3,5 
 Chi² = 0,899 (not significant) 
 It is important that there is an equal number of men and women in 
parliament (N = 1617) 
 (Strongly) agree Agree nor disagree Strongly (disagree) 
Voter 46,6 24,1 29,3 
Non‐voter 43,0 30,3 26,7 
 Chi² = 7,922 (p = 0,019) 
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The first statement is about giving equal responsibilities to men and women in politics. The results in 
Table 4 show that there is almost unanimity that political responsibilities should be shared. 
Differences between voters and non‐voters are small and non‐significant: 89 per cent of the voters 
agree with the idea of shared responsibilities, while also 88 per cent of the non‐voters does so. The 
percentage of people that disagree is with 3 per cent equally low for voters and non‐voters. In sum, 
based on the analysis of the first statement, no differences in gender role attitudes between voters 
and non‐voters could be detected. 
The second statement refers to an equal descriptive representation for men and women in 
parliament. The opinions of voters and non‐voters do differ significantly here, but the direction of 
difference is not clear. The percentage of voters that agree with an equal representation in 
parliament is with 46 per cent higher than the share of non‐voters supporting this idea (43 per cent). 
But also the opponents of descriptive representation are more numerous among voters (29 per cent) 
than among non‐voters (26 per cent). 
In conclusion, there are some minor differences in how voters and non‐voters perceive women in 
politics, but these differences are small and not always unequivocal. This allows us to conclude that 
gender role attitudes could only provide a minor explanation for differences in voting for women 
between voters and non‐voters.  
Conclusion  
The presence of women in parliaments has been high on the research agenda for several decades. 
There is a broad consensus in the literature that the list variant of proportional representation is 
more beneficial for women’s representation than majoritarian systems.  
Research on the effects of electoral rules has, however, often overlooked other aspects of electoral 
systems that could have gendered effects. In this paper, we focused on one specific institutional 
variable that is part of the electoral system: the provision of compulsory voting. By conducting an in‐
depth analysis on Belgium, one of the about 30 countries in the world using compulsory voting, we 
hoped to gain more insight in the underlying mechanisms of the gender effects of compulsory voting.  
While it could be argued that compulsory voting is beneficial for the formal representation of socially 
disadvantaged groups, including women, its effect on the descriptive representation of women 
remained underexposed until now. In a cross‐country analysis on the macro level, Studlar & 
McAlister (2002) analyzed female representation for 20 industrialized democracies over a period of 
half a century (from 1950 to 2000). They found a negative effect from compulsory voting on women’s 
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descriptive representation, but no theoretical explanations were given. It was our aim to search for 
these explanations and to consider their actual role in influencing women’s descriptive 
representation. To that end, we developed two theoretical explanations.  
One major explanation is that potential non‐voters (i.e. those who would no longer vote when 
compulsory voting is lifted) vote less sophisticated (more list, head of list and incumbency voting), 
which is a disadvantage for women, because often they are not on top of the ballot and have less 
political experience. Preferential voting in general, and specifically voting for women (who often take 
positions lower down the list), can be considered as sophisticated electoral behavior that requires 
skills and attitudes. Potential non‐voters often lack these skills and attitudes.  
Secondly, we pointed to differences in voter attitudes about the role of women in political life. 
Although over time clear progress has been made, not all voters are equally convinced about the 
extent that women should play a prominent role in politics (Jennings, 2006). We hypothesized that 
voters with low levels of political interest tend to be less convinced about the political role of 
women, and research has found out that precisely this kind of voters are also more likely to abstain if 
compulsory voting is lifted. Therefore, we expect that when voters with low interest in politics are 
forced to vote (by compulsory voting), they will be less likely to vote for women.  
For our empirical analysis, we made use of date of the Partirep Election Study, which is an electoral 
panel survey held before and after the national elections of 2014 in Belgium. In line with our 
expectations, we found that non‐voters not only cast fewer preference votes, but they also vote less 
often for women candidates when casting a preference vote.  
When it comes to explaining these effects, the only significant differences between voters and 
potential non‐voters are related to the level of sophistication of the vote. Non‐voters vote 
significantly more for top candidates (mostly men) and give significantly less preference votes for 
candidates lower down the list (this is especially true for voting ballots that combine votes for both 
men and women). Non‐voters seem to have a clear preference for votes that do not require much 
effort and knowledge. This points us to the fact that non‐voters do not appear to have a negative 
bias towards women candidates, but that their less frequent vote for women is caused by the fact 
that this kind of voters does not really ‘choose’ candidates, but follows the figure heads (mostly men) 
put forward by the party.  
For our second explanation, we found no clear evidence. There are some minor differences in how 
voters and non‐voters perceive women in politics, but these differences are small and not always 
unequivocal. Therefore, we conclude that gender role attitudes do not provide an explanation for 
differences in voting for women between voters and non‐voters.  
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Our findings indicate that compulsory voting has a negative effect on the descriptive representation 
of women. Female politicians would thus gain by abolishing compulsory voting and be able to attract 
more votes.  
But we have to point to the effects that abolishing compulsory voting could have on the formal 
representation of subordinated groups in society (including women). Some research indicates that 
women are more likely to abstain if voting was no longer compulsory. Abolishing compulsory voting 
might as such form a deterioration of the formal representation of women. As important issues to 
those who would no longer vote, will receive less attention in the policy process, a decrease in 
women’s formal representation would potentially have detrimental effects on their substantive 
representation.  
We end by discussing three implications of our findings and at the same time avenues for future 
research are developed. 
First, there is a clear trade‐off between boosting women’s descriptive representation by abolishing 
compulsory voting and keeping women’s formal representation on the current level by maintaining 
compulsory voting. Both dimensions of representation have an effect on substantive representation, 
which is often considered the most important dimension of representation (e.g. Pitkin, 1967). Formal 
representation leads to politicians who, out of electoral concerns, take interests of potential voters 
into account, but the descriptive representation ensures that champions of women’s interests are 
present in parliament.  
Policy makers, female politicians and women’s interest groups have to consider this trade‐off and 
have to define their position towards abolishing or maintaining compulsory voting. In other words, 
they have to determine what is most important to them: electoral incentives making the equal 
consideration of all interests attractive or a higher proportion of female representatives in order to 
actively promote these interests.  
Secondly, we want to highlight that in our study party selectorates come again forward as main 
culprit for women’s underrepresentation. If they would equally nominate men and women at the top 
of the lists, no gender effects of compulsory voting would appear, as these effects are mainly driven 
by voters following the choices of the party elite.  
When the selection of candidates depends heavily on the views and initiatives of party elites, the 
onus for change lies with them. Further research is therefore necessary to gain more insights into the 
factors that prevent women from being selected by those political elites. It would be particular 
interesting to examine which sex‐role stereotypes influence this process.  
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Finally, by digging deeper into the relationship between compulsory voting and women’s 
representation and by focusing on the micro level (i.e. voters), we were able to provide a significant 
contribution to the existing literature on electoral systems and the factors that shape women’s 
representation. The negative effect of compulsory voting on the descriptive representation of 
women, already demonstrated in the cross‐country study of Studlar and McAllister (2002), came 
again forward from our analysis. We showed that this effect is mainly attributable to voting behavior 
of potential non‐voters that is not very sophisticated, and not to their gender role attitudes. It 
remains to be seen whether the same applies in other countries, where the share of women in 
parliament (which positively influences gender role attitudes) is lower than in Belgium. In addition, 
future research should also investigate whether our findings are typical for systems of compulsory 
voting, or whether turnout in general is the central variable in this perspective.  
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